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When patented, brand-name antibiotics lose market exclusivity, generics typically enter the
market at lower prices, which may increase consumption of the drug. To examine the effect
of generic market entry on antibiotic consumption in the United States, we conducted an
interrupted time series analysis of the change in the number of prescriptions per month for
antibiotics for which at least one generic entered the US market between 2000 and 2012.
Data were acquired from the IQVIA Xponent database. Thirteen antibiotics were analyzed.
Here, we show that one year after generic entry, the number of prescriptions increased for
ﬁve antibiotics (5 to 406%)—aztreonam, cefpodoxime, ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin, oﬂoxacin
—and decreased for one drug: cefdinir. These changes were sustained two years after.
Cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil and clarithromycin had signiﬁcant increases in trend, but no
signiﬁcant level changes. No consistent pattern for antibiotic use following generic entry in
the United States was observed.
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ntimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global challenge that
raises mortality from infectious diseases and increases
healthcare costs1,2. Antibiotic use is a primary driver of
3
AMR and remains at a high level in the United States, despite
efforts to improve prescribing practices and discourage inappropriate use4,5. As much as 30% of oral antibiotic use in the
United States may be unnecessary6. Apart from factors such as
patients’ and physicians’ expectations, physicians’ training, and
patient characteristics7,8, the price and introduction of generics are
potential drivers for overconsumption9–14. Generic drugs enter
the market shortly after exclusivity rights (e.g., patent protection
and data exclusivity) for the original patented drug end14. This
was made possible by the Hatch-Waxman act, allowing companies
to obtain approval for generic drugs without conducting additional clinical trials14. As a result, availability and access increase,
while individual and national health expenditures fall, beneﬁting
healthcare systems15,16. In the case of antibiotics, generics could
potentially increase inappropriate antibiotic consumption and
hasten the development of antibiotic resistance9–14,17.
After generic entry, amoxicillin-clavulanate use in the United
States and ciproﬂoxacin use in Denmark increased9,14. In Denmark, study ﬁndings showed a correlation between generic entry
of ciproﬂoxacin and increased cases of ciproﬂoxacin-resistant
Escherichia coli from urine isolates9. In Germany, generic entry
of cephalosporins and ﬂuoroquinolones increased the use of
these antibiotic classes13. A more recent study examining the
effect of generic entry of levoﬂoxacin on ﬂuoroquinolone use and
meropenem on carbapenem use in ﬁve European Union countries and in the United States18 showed signiﬁcant increases in
some cases and signiﬁcant decreases in others, with no discernible patterns between different antibiotics or different
countries. These previous studies have focused only on a few
antibiotics, not addressed alternative explanations to their ﬁndings (co-interventions)9,14,18 or not accounted for secular
trends14.
In this study, we analyze the effect of loss of exclusivity on the
use of antibiotics for systemic use that had at least one generic
enter the US market between 2000 and 2012, using an interrupted
time series (ITS) design. We hypothesized that a level increase in
antibiotic prescriptions would be visible by 6–12 months after the
entry of the ﬁrst generic and by 24 months at the latest. This was
the case for ﬁve antibiotics (aztreonam, cefpodoxime, ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin, and oﬂoxacin), whereas one (cefdinir)
showed a decrease, one year after generic entry. These changes
were sustained two years after. Our second hypothesis was an
increase in trend, which was the case for three antibiotics (cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, and clarithromycin). These changes
represented use leveling out. Together, these ﬁndings indicate no
consistent pattern for antibiotic use following generic entry in the
United States.
Results
Descriptive analysis. We identiﬁed 13 antibiotics that met the
inclusion criteria (Figs. 1 and 2). Cefuroxime axetil was included
despite generic availability of cefuroxime sodium, which comes
only as an intravenous (IV) drug, whereas cefuroxime axetil is an
oral treatment available for outpatient care. Azithromycin had the
highest number of prescriptions—approximately three times
greater than any other antibiotic—at the time of generic entry,
followed by ciproﬂoxacin, cefdinir, levoﬂoxacin, clarithromycin,
and cefuroxime axetil. For all but two antibiotics (aztreonam and
piperacillin/tazobactam), prescriptions almost completely consisted of generic products after generic entry. Aztreonam and
piperacillin/tazobactam were, together with cefpodoxime, demeclocyline, and meropenem, the antibiotics with only one or two
2

manufacturers of generic products one year after generic entry
(Supplementary Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1).
Overview of results. Prescriptions for ﬁve antibiotics—aztreonam, cefpodoxime, ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin, and oﬂoxacin—
had a statistically signiﬁcant increase 6–12 months after generic
entry, which was sustained two years after generic entry. Cefdinir
was the only antibiotic showing a signiﬁcant decrease in prescriptions against the historical trend, sustained over time
(Tables 1 and 2). Cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, and clarithromycin
experienced immediate signiﬁcant increases in trend, but with no
signiﬁcant changes in the level detected within two years of
generic entry. Eight of the 13 antibiotics had a declining trend
prior to generic entry (Table 1) (9 including levoﬂoxacin based on
visual inspection), including four of the antibiotics with the
highest number of prescriptions (cefuroxime axetil, ciproﬂoxacin,
clarithromycin, and levoﬂoxacin). In two of the cases showing
signiﬁcant level changes—ciproﬂoxacin and levoﬂoxacin—prescriptions initially declined, then rose. In four cases—aztreonam,
cefdinir, cefpodoxime, and oﬂoxacin—the changes represented
trends leveling out. This was also the case for cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, and clarithromycin. For the remaining antibiotics,
no signiﬁcant changes were detected (Figs. 1 and 2).
Changes in number of prescriptions 6–12 months after generic
entry. Six months after generic entry, ciproﬂoxacin prescriptions
had increased by 427.82 per one million population (95% conﬁdence interval [CI] 247.18 to 608.45, p-value < 0.001, relative
change 12%), oﬂoxacin prescriptions had increased signiﬁcantly
by 0.17 per one million population (95% CI 0.10 to 0.24, p-value
< 0.001; note logged data, relative change 4%), whereas cefdinir
prescriptions had decreased by −0.27 per one million population
(95% CI −0.45 to −0.10, p-value 0.003; note logged data, relative
change 3%). Twelve months after generic entry, aztreonam prescriptions had increased signiﬁcantly by 0.04 per one million
population (95% CI 0.01 to 0.08, p-value = 0.018, relative change
406%), cefpodoxime prescriptions increased by 0.22 per one
million population (95% CI 0.03 to 0.41, p-value = 0.026; note
logged data, relative change 5%), and levoﬂoxacin prescriptions
increased by 672.41 per one million population (95% CI 495.93 to
848.89, p-value < 0.001, relative chage 29%) (Table 2 and Supplementary Table 2).
Changes in number of prescriptions 24 months after generic
entry. For the six antibiotics that showed signiﬁcant increases/
decreases 6–12 months after generic entry, changes were sustained
over the subsequent year. Twenty-four months after generic entry,
prescriptions had increased signiﬁcantly for ciproﬂoxacin by
1104.26 per one million population (95% CI 887.76 to 1320.76, pvalue < 0.001, relative change 33%), oﬂoxacin prescriptions by 0.38
per one million population (95% CI 0.29 to 0.48, p-value < 0.001,
note logged data, relative change 12%), whereas cefdinir prescriptions had decreased signiﬁcantly by −0.85 per one million
population (95% CI −1.12 to −0.58, p-value < 0.001, note logged
data, relative change 10%). Aztreonam prescriptions had signiﬁcantly increased by 0.05 per one million population (95% CI
0.01 to 0.09, p-value = 0.008, relative change not availbale due to
negative values), cefpodoxime prescriptions by 0.45 per one million population (95% CI 0.20 to 0.70, p-value = 0.001; note logged
data, relative change 12%), and levoﬂoxacin prescriptions by
1989.14 per one million population (95% CI 1668.09 to 2310.19,
p-value < 0.001, relative change 125%) (Table 2 and Supplementary Table 2).
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Fig. 1 Antibiotics showing a signiﬁcant level increase/decrease within two years after generic entry. Change in number of antibiotic prescriptions per
one million population before and after generic entry (vertical line), with projected level of prescriptions if generic entry had not taken place (dashed line). a
Aztreonam. b Cefdinir; note logged data. c Cefpodoxime; note logged data. d Ciproﬂoxacin. e Levoﬂoxacin. f Oﬂoxacin; note logged data.
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Fig. 2 Antibiotics showing no signiﬁcant level change within two years after generic entry. Change in number of antibiotic prescriptions per one
million population before and after generic entry (vertical line), with projected level of prescriptions if generic entry had not taken place (dashed line).
a Azithromycin. b Cefprozil; note logged data. c Cefuroxime axetil. d Clarithromycin. e Demeclocycline. f Meropenem. g Piperacillin/tazobactam.
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Table 1 Trends before and after generic entry.
Baseline trend

Immediate change in trend

Antibiotic

Estimate

95% CI

p-Value

Estimate

95% CI

p-Value

Azithromycin
Aztreonam
Cefdinira
Cefpodoximea
Cefprozila
Cefuroxime axetil
Ciproﬂoxacin
Clarithromycin
Demeclocycline
Levoﬂoxacin
Meropenem
Oﬂoxacina
Piperacillin/Tazobactam

37.991
−0.001
0.028
−0.023
−0.014
−18.691
−8.066
−28.233
0.018

(22.219, 53.763)
(−0.002, −0.001)
(0.023, 0.032)
(−0.029, −0.018)
(−0.015, −0.013)
(−26.250, −11.132)
(−11.648, −4.485)
(−36.437, −20.028)
(0.000, 0.035)

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.044

(0.000, 0.001)
(−0.037, −0.033)
(−0.002, 0.001)

0.007
<0.001
0.199

−3.677
0.001
−0.032
0.019
0.008
17.513
37.580
17.987
−0.012
57.064
0.002
0.012
0.001

(−25.545, 18.190)
(−0.001, 0.004)
(−0.042, −0.023)
(0.012, 0.027)
(0.006, 0.010)
(9.466, 25.560)
(32.815, 42.346)
(6.922, 29.052)
(−0.033, 0.009)
(2.188, 111.940)
(−0.002, 0.007)
(0.010, 0.014)
(−0.008, 0.009)

0.740
0.328
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.002
0.251
0.042
0.281
<0.001
0.880

0.001
−0.035
−0.001

Results of the interrupted time series analysis, measuring the changes in number of antibiotic prescriptions per one million population per month. “Baseline trend” corresponds to the trend in
prescriptions before generic entry. “Immediate change in trend” corresponds to the change in trend after generic entry. Graphs used to assess linearity and seasonality, as well as Akaike information
criterion and the Bayesian information criterion for each antibiotic is available in the Supplementary Figs. 4–16. Either segmented regression was used with Prais–Winsten regression when autocorrelation
was present. Two-sided test was used with no adjustment for multiple comparisons.
aData were logged.

Sensitivity analysis and co-interventions. In 2001, the United
States experienced the anthrax attacks. As a result, the United States
stockpiled ciproﬂoxacin, leading to price negotiations with the
innovator, Bayer19,20. After the US government threatened a
compulsory license, Bayer agreed to lower prices in October 2001.
Given the unique media attention and direct price intervention for
ciproﬂoxacin, we conducted an ITS analysis excluding the anthrax
attacks. This analysis showed that generic introduction had a signiﬁcant increase in prescriptions of 408.60 per one million population (95% CI 59.54 to 757.66, p-value = 0.022, relative change
11%) after 12 months and 803.76 per one million population (95%
CI 314.13 to 1293.39, p-value = 0.002, relative change 22%) by
24 months (Supplementary Tables 2–4). Meropenem and piperacillin/tazobactam showed greater variation in the beginning of the
time series, whereas ciproﬂoxacin had one outlier in the preintervention data. In addition, we identiﬁed a total shortage of
aztreonam between June 2009 and June 2010 reported by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). Removing data for the months
affected by the aztreonam shortage, removing the ciproﬂoxacin
outlier, and restricting the dataset to only include data from 2005 in
the case of meropenem and from 2007 in the case of piperacillin/
tazobactam did not alter the results, apart from postponing the
signiﬁcant increase seen in aztreonam by 6 months (Supplementary
Tables 3 and 4).
Discussion
In this study, we used ITS analyses to measure the effect of
generic entry on antibiotic prescriptions in the United States.
Signiﬁcant increases in prescriptions were observed one year after
generics were introduced in the case of ﬁve antibiotics: aztreonam, cefpodoxime, ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin, and oﬂoxacin.
One antibiotic—cefdinir—had a signiﬁcant decrease in prescriptions one year after generic entry. For all six, the changes were
sustained two years after. In the case of aztreonam, cefpodoxime,
and oﬂoxacin, the changes represented negative trends leveling
out. In two instances—ciproﬂoxacin and levoﬂoxacin—generic
entry led to negative prescription trends turning positive.
Although cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, and clarithromycin
experienced immediate signiﬁcant increases in trend, there were
no signiﬁcant changes in the level detected within two years of
generic entry. Use of these three antibiotics represented a leveling
4

out over time. In the remaining cases, results were insigniﬁcant.
All three ﬂuoroquinolones included in the study were among the
ﬁve antibiotics showing signiﬁcant increases sustained two years
after generic entry. However, the results suggest that the increase
in ciproﬂoxacin was partly the result of the anthrax attacks and
the subsequent price negotiation and stockpiling in October 2001.
Research on the effect of market exclusivity on drug use is
relevant for the discussion about affordability and access to
medicines, as well as responsible use. Multiple reports show how
drug prices are increasing in the United States, reducing access
and compromising health21,22. At the same time antibiotic
resistance is increasing globally because of overuse of antibiotics4.
For most antibiotics included in this study, use was declining even
before generic entry took place and no dramatic change occurred
when generics entered the market. This is not surprising, given
that antibiotics are relatively inexpensive products, available only
by prescription, and face competition from other antibiotics even
when under patent protection. Many antibiotics also show strong
seasonal trends, implying that the use depends on infectious
disease prevalence—something that makes antibiotics different
from, e.g., opioids.
Other factors coincident with generic entry, so-called cointerventions, could alter the trajectory of prescriptions23,24. We
found that generic entry for aztreonam coincided with the market
entry of Cayston (an inhalation treatment often used for patients
with cystic ﬁbrosis). This could have promoted the IV formulation of aztreonam as a treatment option for patients with cystic
ﬁbrosis and increased its use, as the IV formulation of aztreonam
has clinical beneﬁts for cystic ﬁbrosis patients as well25, and as IV
antibiotics are sometimes used for preparing inhalations. Another
plausible explanation for the observed changes in prescriptions
for aztreonam, cefpodoxime, and oﬂoxacin is that consumption
leveled out when approaching zero, as “negative consumption” is
not possible. In the case of ciproﬂoxacin, the anthrax attacks and
resulting stockpiling seem to have affected prescriptions. We did
not ﬁnd alternative explanations for the signiﬁcant changes seen
in the other antibiotics. FDA reported safety issues for ﬂuoroquinolones in October and December 2008 due to an increased
risk for tendinitis and tendon rupture, and azithromyzin in May
2012 and December 2013 due to an increased risk for fatal irregular heart rythms26. None of these events coincided with time of
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Results of the interrupted time series analysis, measuring the change in number of antibiotic prescriptions per one million population 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after generic entry. Graphs used to assess linearity and seasonality, as well as Akaike information criterion and the
Bayesian information criterion for each antibiotic is available in the Supplementary Figs. 4–16. Either segmented regression was used with Prais–Winsten regression when autocorrelation was present. Two-sided test was used with no adjustment for multiple comparison.
aData were logged.

0.844
0.008
<0.001
0.001
0.134
0.204
<0.001
0.075
0.262
<0.001
0.414
<0.001
0.702
(−1046.904, 1278.846)
(0.010, 0.094)
(−1.118, −0.584)
(0.195, 0.702)
(−0.021, 0.156)
(−108.126, 501.584)
(887.763, 1320.762)
(−48.821, 1021.130)
(−1.479, 0.405)
(1668.087, 2310.185)
(−0.043, 0.104)
(0.288, 0.478)
(−0.207, 0.140)
0.766
138.036 (−968.186, 1244.258) 0.806
115.971
0.018
0.049 (0.014, 0.084)
0.006
0.052
<0.001
−0.658 (−0.885, −0.431)
<0.001
−0.851
0.026
0.333 (0.113, 0.553)
0.003
0.449
0.491
0.020 (−0.064, 0.103)
0.644
0.067
0.906
91.653 (−171.241, 354.547)
0.492
196.729
<0.001
878.780 (677.562, 1079.998)
<0.001 1104.263
0.257
378.232 (−120.507, 876.970)
0.136
486.154
0.322
−0.464 (−1.319, 0.390)
0.285
−0.537
<0.001 −237.630 (−514.428, 39.168)
0.092 1989.136
0.936
0.016 (−0.045, 0.077)
0.598
0.030
<0.001
0.312 (0.226, 0.399)
<0.001
0.383
0.606
−0.037 (−0.195, 0.120)
0.641
−0.034
160.101 (−902.728, 1222.929)
0.042 (0.007, 0.076)
−0.464 (−0.659, −0.269)
0.217 (0.026, 0.407)
−0.028 (−0.108, 0.052)
−13.424 (−236.923, 210.076)
653.298 (464.246, 842.349)
270.309 (−198.835, 739.453)
−0.392 (−1.170, 0.386)
672.409 (495.931, 848.886)
0.002 (−0.056, 0.061)
0.241 (0.162, 0.320)
−0.041 (−0.199, 0.116)
182.165
0.034
−0.271
0.101
−0.076
−118.500
427.815
162.386
−0.319
103.343
−0.012
0.170
−0.045
Azithromycin
Aztreonam
Cefdinira
Cefpodoximea
Cefprozila
Cefuroxime axetil
Ciproﬂoxacin
Clarithromycin
Demeclocycline
Levoﬂoxacin
Meropenem
Oﬂoxacina
Piperacillin/
tazobactam

(−852.199, 1216.530) 0.728
(−0.006, 0.074)
0.100
(−0.447, −0.095)
0.003
(−0.067, 0.270)
0.237
(−0.154, 0.002)
0.057
(−306.791, 69.791)
0.216
(247.184, 608.446)
<0.001
(−285.127, 609.899)
0.475
(−1.034, 0.396)
0.379
(−77.097, 283.784)
0.260
(−0.078, 0.055)
0.729
(0.097, 0.243)
<0.001
(−0.217, 0.127)
0.606

pValue
95% CI
Estimate
pValue
95% CI
Estimate
pValue
pValue
Estimate
Antibiotic

95% CI

Estimate 95% CI

Change in level 12 months after generic
introduction
Change in level 6 months after generic
introduction

Table 2 Level change after generic entry.

Change in level 18 months after generic
introduction

Change in level 24 months after generic
introduction
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generic entry for these drugs. Unrelated to generic entry, it is
possible that the decrease in levoﬂoxacin, beginning in 2008, was
partly due to safety issues, as that was the year FDA issued a
safety warning. One of the effects of vaccines is a decrease in the
use of antibiotics27. Five vaccines were added to the vaccination
program in the United States between 2000 and 2012; pneumococcal vaccines in 2000 (7-valent) and 2010 (13-valent), inﬂuenza
vaccine in 2004, quadrivalent meningococcal vaccine in 2005, and
rotavirus vaccine in 200628. The 7-valent pneumococcal vaccine
had a major impact on infections caused by the bacteria strains
covered by the vaccine, with the main effect seen between 2000
and 200229. This coincided with the generic introduction of
cefuroxime axetil and could have masked a signiﬁcant increase in
use, which, according to our results, had an insigniﬁcant increase.
Based on the same logic, the increase in the use of levoﬂoxacin
could have been reduced by the introduction of the 13-valent
pneumococcal vaccine causing a decrease in upper respiratory
tract infections. However, decreases should then be visible in
other respiratory tract antibiotics as well at this point in time,
which was not the case. In contrast to the other vaccines, which
target mainly the younger population, the inﬂuenza vaccine targets all age groups. Although this makes it relevant to this study,
the impact of the inﬂuenza vaccine is more difﬁcult to assess
given that both effectiveness and coverage differs each season.
Therefore, we cannot rule out that the effect of generic entry of an
antibiotic used for respiratory tract infections was masked by the
inﬂuenza vaccine. In 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) launched the National Campaign for Appropriate Antibiotic Use in the Community, which was renamed Get
Smart: Know when antibiotics work campaign in 200330,31. Get
Smart promotes responsible use of antibiotics and supports states
and communities to develop and implement stewardship
programs32. We did not ﬁnd any programs that were implemented simultaneously in all states, and which could be linked in
time with the dates for generic entry of the antibiotics included in
this study. Although statewide and community-based programs
have contributed to improvement in antibiotic use, it is unlikely
that they would be able to cause a signiﬁcant change in national
use of one speciﬁc antibiotic at a speciﬁc point in time. Between
2000 and 2012, CDC reported increases of macrolide-resistant
bacteria, including Streptococcus pneumoniae, Carbapenemresistant Enterobacteriaceae, extended spectrum Betalactamase,
and ﬂuoroquinolone-resistant bacteria2,33. Although resistance
develops gradually, an immediate impact on use could happen if
the resistance levels led to nationwide guideline changes. We were
not able to detect a guideline change that coincided with our dates
for generic entry. On the contrary, all three ﬂuoroquinolones
included in the study were among the antibiotics with signiﬁcant
increases in prescriptions and in 2012 azithromycin was the most
prescribed antibiotic in outpatient care in the United States,
despite growing levels of resistance towards these antibiotics34.
It is possible that the antibiotics included in this reseach
impacted each other by competing for the same market shares.
This would be relevant primarily for antibiotics with similar
indications, formulation, and generic entry at close proximity in
time. The three ﬂuoroquinolones included in the study all showed
an increase in use, so regardless of whether or not they had an
impact on each other it should not have affected the outcome.
However, a number of the oral antibiotics, where generic entry
had a mixed effect, have respiratory tract infections as indications
—azithromycin, cefdinir, cefpodoxime, cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, clarithromycin, as well as ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin,
and oﬂoxacin (Supplementary Table 5). It is possible that the
generic entry of azithromycin, preceeding the generic entry of
cefdinir and cefprozil, could have contributed to the lack of
increase in cefprozil and the decrease of cefdinir. Then again, as
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azithromycin use far exceeds the use of any of the other antibiotics, one would expect a similar effect on some of the other
antibiotics, or that there would be no signiﬁcant increases at all
for any of the antibiotics with lower levels of use. Given the
number of indications for each antibiotic, it is difﬁcult to know
exactly which antibiotic would substitute another in practice and
we acknowledge that there is likely some level of impact between
the different antibiotics. However, we were not able to detect any
patterns that would support the idea that our ﬁndings were the
result of generic entry of the other antibiotics.
The signiﬁcant decrease in cefdinir was surprising. It may have
been related to the decrease in the prevalence of acute otitis
media, which has been attributed partly to a change in treatment
recommendations and introduction of pneumococcal
vaccines35,36. However, the decrease took place in between the
introduction of the two vaccines, so it is unlikely that the 7-valent
pneumococcal vaccine would have caused a sharp decrease in use
seven years after introduction. Clinical treatment guidelines from
2004 lists amoxicillin as the ﬁrst-line treatment for acute otitis
media. In the case of allergy, cefdinir, cefpodoxime, and cefuroxime axetil are listed as alternatives37. It is possible that the
generic introduction of cefuroxime axetil in 2002 and cefpodoxime in 2004 contributed to the decreased use of cefdinir. In
addition, azithromycin, one of the most commonly used antibiotics for respiratory tract infections, became available as a
generic little more than a year before cefdinir became available as
a generic. This could have contributed to the decrease in cefdinir
since the two antibiotics have similar indications.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, consistent with evidence from other
countries18, generic entry has limited and inconsistent effects on
antibiotic use in the United States, with no signiﬁcant, sustained
increase in more than half of cases. However, we note that there was
a positive signiﬁcant change in trend without an accompanying
change in level for three of the 13 antibiotics and, although trends
leveling out as sales approach zero might partly explain this, we
cannot rule out the possibility that introduction of generics may
lead to a change in trend that leads to increased prescribing over
longer time horizons. Overall, prescriptions were surprisingly stable
over time. The reason for increasing levels of antibiotic prescriptions (and thereby use) and resistance is multifactorial and complex,
and models should not assume that generic entry will automatically
increase antibiotic prescriptions in settings like the United States.
Nevertheless, some antibiotic classes, namely ﬂuoroquinolones,
could be more sensitive. Interestingly, a signiﬁcant increase in
ﬂuoroquinolone use was also observed by Stephens18, by Jensen
et al.9, and by Kaier13. However, it is difﬁcult to know whether this
is coincidental, as the three studies did not include more than one
other antibiotic or class and did not discuss alternative explanations
for their ﬁndings. Also, the increase in ﬂuoroquinolones was
notable, given the well-known problems related to both resistance
and side effects38. Arguably, this increase could be considered
inappropriate (even if the anthrax attacks were a likely contributing
factor), but without looking at overall antibiotic use and use by
antibiotic class, this is difﬁcult to judge.
Our study included all antibiotics for which generics were
introduced between 2000 and 2012, which allows for analyzing
differences among classes, formulations, and target indications.
Nevertheless, several limitations should be considered when
interpreting our ﬁndings. Research shows that price reductions
depend on the number of generics introduced to market17, with a
small effect on price after the ﬁrst generic entry39; the biggest
price reduction occurs after the second generic entry40. We did
not have access to dates of subsequent generic entry. However, for
eight of the 13 antibiotics in our study, three or more generic
products were approved one year after the ﬁrst generic entry
(Supplementary Table 1)38, making multiple generic entries a
6

possibility for most of the antibiotics. In addition, for most
antibiotics, generics accounted for the majority of prescriptions
within one year of their introduction (Supplementary Fig. 1).
According to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the ﬁrst generic product is
allowed 180 days of exclusivity against subsequent generic
entrants14. Although the rule does not cover authorized generic
products (generics produced by the brand owner), it could have
delayed a potential price reduction by limiting competition. To
account for a delay in the effect of generic entry, we included
analysis of the effect 24 months after the event. Information
regarding the number of manufacturers includes only approvals
to market and depends on companies actively notifying the FDA
if products are taken off market. This means that the number of
manufacturers could have been overestimated. We did not
examine class-based substitution effects, which could explain
some of the trends observed—e.g., if increases in the use of a
particular antibiotic were due to declines in sales in a substitutable product. Finally, we addressed the issue of cointerventions by searching for events that could have affected
use. However, given the multitude of factors that inﬂuence antibiotic use, there could be co-interventions that we have overlooked. Additional research is needed to explore the effect of
generic entry on antibiotic prices and to consider differences
among antibiotic classes. Research is also needed to determine the
effects, including access and antibiotic resistance, when generics
enter the market in low- and middle-income countries.
Methods
Study design. We used an ITS design, a quasi-experimental approach to evaluating public health interventions23,24, to assess the effect of loss of market exclusivity on antibiotic use. The intervention being studied was generic entry, deﬁned
as the month when prescriptions of the ﬁrst generic were ﬁrst recorded. We chose
generic entry to mark the end of exclusivity because alternatives, such as patent
expiration date or approval date of the ﬁrst generic product, do not guarantee that a
generic has entered the market. Moreover, companies manufacturing brand-name
antibiotics may contract with generic manufacturers to distribute a generic version
of the product prior to the end of exclusivity. We therefore compared the date of
the ﬁrst recorded generic prescription with FDA approval dates to ensure that
approval preceded distribution of generics. This was the case for all but one
antibiotic (ciproﬂoxacin), for which the intervention date was set to the month
when both generic prescription and approval had occurred (Supplementary
table 1). The outcome measure was total number of prescriptions per capita per
month (including oral and parenteral formulations of both brand and generic
products).
The effect estimates used in ITS analysis is level and trend23. With respect to
antibiotics, a level change represents the difference in antibiotic use between the
speciﬁed post-intervention time point and the pre-intervention regression line that
is extrapolated to that same time point (counterfactual). A change in trend
represent an increase or decrease in the slope of a time series segment after the
intervention compared with the time series segment preceding the intervention23
(Supplementary Fig. 2). There is no consensus on which effect estimate to report,
and they are inconsistently used when reporting the results of ITS analysis41. The
selection of which effect estimates to give weight ultimately depend on the speciﬁcs
of each individual study, including the intervention and its expected impact on the
outcome measure. Research show that the number of generic products entering the
market and generic price decline is biggest during the ﬁrst 12–24 months after
generic entry, and stabilizing after that42. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
an impact on antibiotic prescriptions should be visible by 6–12 months after the
entry of the ﬁrst generic. Thus, our pre-speciﬁed hypothesis was a change in level at
6 and 12 months as the primary time points to model the effect. To assess whether
the effect was consistent over a longer period or delayed, we also modeled the
effects after 18 and 24 months. These are the same or similar time points that have
been used in other research measuring the impact of generic entry on antibiotic
use9,14,18. In addition, we examined the trend after ﬁrst generic entry to assess
changes in the rate of antibiotic prescriptions. Our second hypothesis was an
immediate change in trend.
Data sources. Data on antibiotic prescriptions in the United States were obtained
from the IQVIA Xponent database, which contains the monthly number of antibiotic prescriptions ﬁlled in a pharmacy based on product sales data from retail
pharmacies. IQVIA Xponent data have been extensively used in other studies of
antibiotic prescribing43–47. As all prescriptions that are ﬁlled are not necessarily
consumed, the number of ﬁlled prescriptions may overstate consumption. We
accounted for population growth using data from the US Census Bureau48.
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Identifying antibiotics for analysis. We identiﬁed antibiotics of interest by
reviewing monthly product prescription data. The inclusion criteria were antibiotics for systemic use for which a generic product entered the market between
2000 and 2012 of the same formulation and strength based on New Drug Application (NDA)/Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) status, obtained from
the FDA website38. The following antibiotics were included: azithromycin,
aztreonam, cefdinir, cefpodoxime, cefprozil, cefuroxime axetil, ciproﬂoxacin, clarithromycin, demeclocycline, levoﬂoxacin, meropenem, oﬂoxacin, and piperacillin/
tazobactam (Figs. 1 and 2). All antibiotics included in our analysis had sales data
for at least 24 months before and 24 months after the date of generic entry,
timelines started in January 1999 for all antibiotics. Additional information about
each antibiotic, obtained from the FDA website38, included the following: active
substance, brand name, generic name, company responsible for approval of the
brand drug, date of NDA/ANDA approval, formulation, class, approved indication,
and number of companies with approved generics 12 and 24 months after generic
entry (Supplementary Tables 1 and 5).

Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability
The data that support the ﬁndings of this study are available from IQVIA
(www.iqvia.com), but restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used
under license for the current study, and so are not publically available. The terms of
IQVIA’s licensing agreement preclude sharing of the data. Other researchers may
purchase the data from IQVIA directly.

Code availability
STATA code is available from Github under https://github.com/ceka2000/Antibioticcodes/tree/v1.0.0
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Statistical analysis. Segmented regression analysis, a statistical method commonly
used in ITS design, was conducted and uses time-series data to measure change in
level and change in trend, allowing for underlying trends before and after the event
of interest (intervention)23,24,49. The statistical model used for this model is
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